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viewed as equitable to would-be salvagers as well as to the state. Although
treasure salvage is now strenuously regulated by statute, there is no indication
that private enterprise in this area will cease to flourish.
CONCLUSION

The law of sea treasure represents one of Florida's most recently
expanded areas of the law. Whether the question of state ownership versus
private property rights is completely settled remains to be seen. It is a
certainty, however, that the state has done a masterful job of balancing the
two interests. Objects of history are an invaluable asset to any state and
should be preserved at all cost. Their preservation, however, presupposes an
inducement to seek their recovery. Fortunately, there is little in the present
state of the law that will discourage private treasure seekers from embarking
on expeditions into Florida waters.
FRANK H. FEE, III

THE EROSION OF FINAL JURISDICTION IN FLORIDA'S
DISTRICT COURTS OF APPEAL
The appellate court is an institution whose roots reach deep into our
common law heritage. In this setting we are able to observe the development
of concepts and rules as they move through a decisional process that attempts
to maintain a correlation between the rule of stare decisis and the demands
of a dynamic society. Prior to 1957, Florida had only the supreme court to
perform this function, but its staggering caseload so overworked the judges
that the administration of justice was fast approaching the point of collapse.
A remedy was sought in the creation of an additional system of appellate
courts to be called the Florida District Court of Appeal. These new courts
were intended to assume general appellate jurisdiction, which had previously
been a providence of the supreme court, and also to provide for most cases
the final stage in the litigational process.
This note will focus upon the interaction of Florida's appellate courtsthe supreme court and the district courts - in light of the reasons advanced
for the creation of an additional court system. The grant of jurisdiction to
the new courts was originally intended to insure that they would enjoy a
role equivalent to that of the supreme court. However, these expectations
have yet to attain fruition, in part because district court judges have proved
reluctant to deviate from supreme court precedent, and also because the
supreme court in the exercise of its conflict jurisdiction has carried its reviewing practices into areas reserved to the district courts by the legislature and
the people of Florida.
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COURTS

The amendment to article V of the Florida constitution' provides the
starting point for a consideration of the district courts since it is the source
of authority for their inception and final court status. Its provisions also
serve to cast light upon the conditions that led to the changes in the judicial
system. By far, the most pressing problems prior to the revision are to be
found in the unprecedented caseload of the supreme court and the concomitant delay in the administration of justice.
From the the time of its origin the supreme court has experienced a steady
increase in its caseload, and by 1956 the point was reached where over 1,300
cases were added to the court's docket in a single year.2 With a workload
of this magnitude a single court of only seven judges could not be expected
to provide a prompt and adequate review in each case. 3 It had become apparent by this time that the wheels of justice were grinding slowly to a halt with
no sign of relief for the future unless effective changes could be made in the
appellate system. The Judicial Council of Florida 4 undertook this task and
began a study of judicial review. After evaluation of a number of plans,
the council settled on the addition of another tier of appellate courts as the
proposal that would best meet the needs of the state. The advantages to this
plan were twofold. First, the additional courts would drastically reduce the
workload of the supreme court, 5 and second, the long trek to Tallahassee for
every appellate review would be ended since the courts could be located
throughout the state where litigation was heaviest."
The draft of the proposal submitted to the legislature could have been
framed so that the jurisdiction of the supreme court would have remained
intact. Had this been done, the district courts would necessarily have enjoyed
1.
2.

FLA. CONsr. art. V (1885), as amended (1956).
The Florida supreme court caseload in 1887 was 83 cases. THIRD ANN. REP., JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF FLA., app. 6 (1956). By 1956 the caseload had increased to 1305 cases. FOURTH
ANN. REP., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA., exhibit 14, at 1 (1957).
3. At the close of 1955 there were 670 cases remaining on the supreme court's docket.
This figure increased to 717 by the end of 1956. FOURTH ANN. REP., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
FLA., supra note 2.

4. The Judicial Council of Florida was organized in 1953. Composed of nine laymen
and eight members of the legal profession, the Council was established to maintain a continuous study of the judiciary in Florida and to recommend changes for improvement of
the administration of justice. FLA. STAT. §43.15 (1967).
5. The Council estimated that the district courts would reduce the over-all caseload
of the supreme court to 450 cases per year. SECOND ANN. REP., JUDICIAL CoUNCIL OF FLA.,
app. 3 (1955).
6. A major deficiency in the pre-district court judicial system was the time and expense required for an appeal. Since the supreme court was located in Tallahassee, a trip
of over 500 miles was required of litigants from South Florida. Singer, Convenience and
Time Justify Cost, 30 FLA. B.J. 149 (1956). The new courts initially divided the state into
three districts. The First District Court of Appeal was located at Tallahassee, the Second at
Lakeland, and the Third in Dade County. FLA. STAT. §35.05 (1967). The constitution was
amended in 1965 to provide a Fourth District Court of Appeal. FLA. CoNST. art. V, §5 (i)
(1885), as amended (1965). This court is located in Palm Beach County. FLA. STAT. §35.05
(1967).
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a restricted jurisdiction that would have limited them to an intermediate
court status. However, a more important role was envisioned for the proposed
courts. Consequently, the council recommended that the jurisdiction of the
supreme court be constricted to the extent necessary to insure that most
litigation in the state would not go beyond the district courts. 7 The proposal
was accepted by the legislature, 8 and after ratification by the voters9 the
district courts of appeal became a reality.' 0
The narrow scope of supreme court jurisdiction to review district court
decisions is specified in the amended constitution. Review by appeal from
those courts is restricted to decisions: (1) initially passing upon the validity
of a state or federal statute or treaty, or (2) initially construing a controlling
provision of the Florida or federal constitution. 1' Since an appeal is granted
to a litigant as a matter of right,'2 it is apparent that a district court was not
intended to be the last stage in litigation involving the validity of statutes or
7. The Florida Bar Journalcarried a number of articles by council members and other
concerned Floridians illustrating the type of court system that was envisioned. Some, of
the more pertinent excerpts follow:
"Many lawyers in the past have opposed the creation of any appellate courts in addition
to the supreme court on the assumption that the new courts would be be 'intermediate'
only, thereby requiring the labor and expense of two appeals instead of just one. The
proposed revision guards against this result by giving the district courts of appeal final
appellate jurisdiction. Only in a very limited area is there the possibility of a further
appeal.
"It is not too much of a stretch of the realities to view the proposal as creating one
appellate court of four branches or divisions. The coordinating division will be the
supreme court itself which will reconcile any conflicts that may develop in decisions of the
other three branches .... The other three divisions (the district courts of appeal) will

have final appellate jurisdiction of substantially all other cases arising within their respective districts." Beggs, A Foundation on Which Other Improvements Can Be Erected, 30
FLA. BJ. 155-56 (1956).
"These district courts are not intermediary courts. They have final appellate jurisdiction
in most cases. Cases of major importance would go directly to the Supreme Court. Thus
the new courts do not present a means for a second appeal, but can held keep dockets
current." Gaines, The Pending Amendment Will Enhance Regard for Judicial System, 30
FLA.BJ. 142 (1956).
"If the judges of Appellate Courts are men of stature-and the responsibility of seeing
that they are rests squarely with the Bar-their decisions should have a convincing finality
that is not now possible with an overloaded Supreme Court calendar and overworked

justices.
"The District Court of Appeal could, with the cooperation of litigant-consdous lawyers,
acquire an acceptance in most matters that would about equal that of the Supreme Court.
They could provide an early 'end of the road' for much litigation.
"If, however, with this remedy at hand, the Supreme Court permits itself to continue
to be involved in the wallow of too-much-to-do, it will endanger that prospect." Pennekamp, A PersonalObligation,30 FLA. B.J. 136 (1956).
8. The legislative history is discussed in SECOND ANN. REP., JUDMCIAL CoUNcIL OF FLA.,
supra note 5, at 5-13.
9. Amendment No. I was ratified by the voters on Nov. 6, 1956.
10. The district courts began operation July 1, 1957. FLA. CONsr. art. V, §26 (1), (5)
(1885), as amended (1956).
11.

FLA. CONsr. art. V, §4 (2) (1885), as amended (1956).

12. Id.
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the construction of constitutions. Instead, it is clear that the supreme court
is to pass ultimately upon such questions.
Jurisdiction of the supreme court to review district court decisions by
certiorari, however, reflects a different purpose. Under these provisions the
court is not required to assume jurisdiction, 13 but in its discretion may do so
when the district court decisions:
(1) affect a class of constitutional or state officers, or
(2) pass upon questions certified by the district court to be of great
public interest, or
(3) are in direct conflict with another district court or the supreme
14
court on the same point of law.
The narrow scope of review afforded by these provisions, when considered in
light of the purposes underlying amended article V suggests that the broad
area of judge made law was to be left to the district courts without significant
interference by the supreme court. The application of the certiorari provisions, however, has failed to reflect the original intent of the constitutional
draftsmen. Rather than sustaining the finality of the district courts, these
provisions have instead proved to be the source of their erosion.
THE Disnucr COURTS
Final Decisions Unaccompanied by Evaluation of Precedent
Although the district courts have been a postive addition to the judiciary
of Florida, there are instances where they have failed to perform functions
that their constitutional underpinnings would permit. This is to be seen
occasionally in those cases where unerring application of stare decisis leads to
the utilization of a Florida supreme court decision as precedent in a district
court case. Under these circumstances the constitution does not provide for
review by the supreme court unless a district court chooses to certify its
decision as a question of great public interest. 5 If the district courts choose
to assume this finality without remaining alert to the continued viability of
the doctrines and rules that are applied, the danger arises that the legal
demands of Florida will outpace the growth of its case law.

13. E.g., Stein v. Darby, 134 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1961).
14. FLA. CONST. art. V, §4 (2) (1885), as amended (1956).
15. Id.
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An example of this problem 6 is found in Wilson v. Redding17 a case
based upon a suit to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile
collision. While the case was in the trial court, a count filed by the wife for
loss of consortium was dismissed. The district court affirmed this action on
the authority of Ripley v. Ewell,28 a 1952 Florida supreme court case, which
held that a wife cannot maintain an action for loss of consortium. Referring
to the Ripley decision, the district court noted that "Florida followed the
common law rule and, there having been no statutory changes since, that
case is still controlling."1 9 The language in the Ripley case reveals that the
doctrine when established in 1952 was not based on the needs of the state. It
was adopted instead because it was part of that amorphous body of common
law that Florida by statute inherited from England.20 Since a wife could not
maintain an action for loss of consortium in Britain, the court reasoned that
Florida's acceptance of the common law carried with it the same prohibition.
An insight into the earlier philosophy of the supreme court is to be found
in its recognition of a decision in the federal courts, which had termed the
consortium rule "specious and fallacious." 2' Despite this attitude, the court
nonetheless thought it should only consider what the law was, and not what
it should be.In the years since Ripley the supreme court has taken a more positive
attitude toward judicial lawmaking and, consequently, it is doubtful that the
court would feel itself constrained today to adopt a rule of law whose primary
virtue rests on its antiquity.23

By the same token, the district court would

have been justified in assuming a less quiescent role in the Wilson case.
There was no assurance that the consortium rule when first adopted in

the

state satisfied any legitimate purpose. To apply the same principle, years
later, solely on the basis of stare decisis is to perpetuate precedent at the cost
of legal development. While there may be valid reasons to support retention
of the rule, the Wilson court failed to discuss them. A more meaningful
decision would have been possible had the court instead based its holdings

16. The district courts have frequently emphasized their reliance on Florida supreme
court precedent. E.g., Langley v. New Deal Cab Co., 138 So. 2d 789, 793 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1962) in which it was stated: "It is elementary that in construing statutes of this
State, this Court is bound by the prior decisions of our highest court and we are not at
liberty to depart therefrom." The decisions referred to are Florida supreme court cases decided in 1948 and 1949, State ex rel. City of Miami Beach v. Carter, 39 So. 2d 552 (Fla.
1949); Brack v. Carter, 160 Fla. 845, 37 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1948). Another illustration is found
in United States v. State, 179 So. 2d 890, 893 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965). There the court noted:
"We are bound by the language of the Supreme Court of Florida as expressed by Justice
Thomas in Warfield v. Drawdy .....
a supreme court case decided in 1949. 41 So. 2d 877
(F- 1949).
17. 145 So. 2d 252 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
18. 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952).
19. Wilson v. Redding, 145 So. 2d 252, 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
20. FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1967).
21. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
22. Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420,423 (Fla. 1952).
23. See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
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on an evaluation of the doctrine vis-i-vis its responsiveness to the prevailing
attitudes in Florida.
Fincher Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank & Trust Co.24 provides yet
another illustration of the predilection that district court judges exhibit toward the application of early supreme court precedent. In an action of replevin a Missouri chattel mortgagee sought to recover an automobile from
a Florida dealer who had received the vehicle from the mortgagor. The district
court refused to enforce the lien, relying upon a 1936 Florida supreme court
case 25 holding that a chattel mortgagee has no legal right to repossess mortgaged property. The Fincher court revealed the impact of stare decisis by its
statement that it was unable to find a subsequent modification of the rule and
26
was therefore bound to apply it as the supreme law of Florida.
Even when the district courts fail to mention specifically the controlling
nature of supreme court precedent, its influence upon their decisional process
remains significant. In Adler v. Copeland2 7 for instance, the third district
8
court cited Allen v. William P. McDonald Corp.,2 a 1949 Florida supreme

court case, as authority for its holding that a swimming pool is not an
attractive nuisance. In Allen the supreme court had established the principle
that artificial bodies of water are not attractive nuisances unless their construction constitutes a trap or unless there is some unusual element of danger
uncommon to ponds generally. Relying on this principle for its decision that
a pool is not "inherently dangerous," the district court in Adler stated: 2
In the instant case, there was nothing shown that constituted a trap or
latent danger. Swimming pools are fairly common in South Florida
and they normally present no hidden danger as far as their construction is concerned.
When this language is compared with the rule in the Allen case, it becomes
obvious that the district court was concerned with whether the elements
contained within that principle were satisfied. The Adler case has been
commented upon, one writer suggesting that there are elements of social
policy that must be considered before a just decision can be reached in
attractive nuisance cases. 30 Of course, it is possible that this form of evaluation occurred, but if it did the court failed to verbalize its considerations.
The cases discussed so far are indicative of the ease with which the district
courts apply supreme court precedent irrespective of its vintage. Another
feature they share is the failure to provide for further review of their decisions
in the supreme court. It will be recalled that the jurisdiction of the supreme
24. 166 So. 2d 717 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
25. Snow v. Nowlin, 125 Fla. 166, 169 So. 598 (1936).
26. Fincher Motors, Inc. v. Northwestern Bank & Trust Co., 166 So. 2d 717, 719 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
27. 105 So. 2d 594 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
28. 42 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1949).
29. 105 So. 2d 594, 595 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
30. Comment, Torts: The Attractive Nuisance Doctrine, 16 U. FiA. L. Rav. 640, 642,
643 (1964).
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court in these cases would have to rest upon either conflict or certification.31
Since the district courts abided by earlier supreme court pronouncements
there was no basis for conflict review. Similarly, the lack of certification foredosed the alternative route to further review. Consequently, even if the
court had been disposed to reevaluate its earlier decisions, the jurisdictional
limitations would not have allowed it to do so. The end result is continued
application of rules and doctrines established years ago, with virtually no
chance of reconsideration unless the district courts choose to initiate it.
An Intermediate Court Philosophy Is Maintained Via Certification
The preceding cases center about the difficulties that may arise if the
district courts combine an intermediate court attitude -through failure to
evaluate precedent-with an assumption of finality. We turn now to a more
common occurrence where the courts, aware of the need for reevaluation,
refuse to carry it out. The district courts have long thought that doctrinal
development lies within the exclusive prerogatives of the Florida supreme
court. Commenting upon what it thought to be the proper technique for
reexamination, the district court in Walker v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. 32 stated: 83
If this is to be done, it is our view that such re-examination should
be made by our Supreme Court which first pronounced the doctrine as
the law of Florida.
The district courts have consequently turned to the use of certification in
order to allow the supreme court to review its earlier pronouncements. However, as the court in the Walker case learned, there are drawbacks to this
procedure. In that case, the district court stated that its decision was controlled by a 1939 Florida supreme court decision,3 4 which held that a sheriff
or his surety may be held liable for acts done by virtue of the office, but not
for acts done under color of the office. Upon the district court's refusal to
deviate from the doctrine, the appellant petitioned for certification, alleging
that the supreme court in more recent decisions had cast doubt on the
validity of the rule, and also that it had "been discredited and receded from
by recent decisions rendered in other jurisdictions." 35 It was recognized by
the court that there were "cogent reasons" to support reexamination. Yet in
certifying the case, the district court was careful to point out that it was not
advocating a change in doctrine. The majority preferred instead to remain
neutral and let the supreme court have the opportunity to reevaluate its
earlier decision. However, the supreme court simply denied the petition and

31. See supranotes 11, 12, 13, 14 and accompanying text.
32. 101 So. 2d 437 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
33. Id. at 438.

84. Malone v. Howell, 140 Fla. 693, 192 So. 224 (1939).
35. Walker v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 101 So. 2d 437, 438 (Ist D.CA.),
cert. denied, 102 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
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thereby frustrated the desires of the district court that the law be reexamined.36
On occasion the district courts have turned to judicial advocacy in an
attempt to avoid consequences similar to those in the Walker case. By this
technique they are able to decide a case in accordance with supreme court
decisions while at the same time protesting the result. Then, as Hines v. State3
points out, upon certification, the supreme court will have the district court's
opinion for its consideration. In Hines the prosecutor during his questioning
of the appellant brought out the fact that he had failed to testify in his
behalf at the preliminary hearing. This procedure was asserted to be a violation of the statute providing that no prosecutor shall comment on the failure
of an accused to testify in his own behalf. The philosophy of the district
court was exposed by its confrontation with a 1939 Florida supreme court
case, 38 which in effect held that the procedure utilized in Hines was prejudicial
to the accused and deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
Although the district court felt constrained to follow this precedent, it stated
that "in all candor" were it not for the supreme court decision a contrary
ruling would have been adopted. The court went on to set forth the changes
it thought desirable, and upon certification the supreme court accepted
jurisdiction and modified the law to conform to the district court's recommendations.3 9
A comparison of the decisions in Walker and Hines reveals their divergence on a significant point. In the former case the court was aware of "cogent"
reasons for reevaluating supreme court precedent, yet the judges thought that
task beyond their sphere of responsibility and consequently refused to give any
indication of their views. This is disturbing in view of the fact that the district
courts were given sufficient jurisdiction to participate in the development of
Florida's law. The Hines case is beyond criticism on this point since the
judges expressly advocated a change in their opinion. But even that court
failed to take the ultimate step to achieve an independent decision and
instead thrust that burden on the supreme court. The question must be
asked whether either court was under some compulsion to shift the responsibility of doctrinal development onto the shoulders of the supreme court. Of
course, many elements found within our scheme of jurisprudence would predispose a court toward this procedure. Stare decisis alone, with its deep historical roots, would certainly weigh heavily in a court's desire to maintain
at least a degree of superficial consistency in the body of doctrine. There is
also the normal judicial hierarchy that exists in most states, characterized by
the deference paid to the supreme courts. Choosing between these reasons,
it appears that the former is of primary concern to the courts in Florida. The
district courts, especially, have grounded their refusal to engage in doctrinal
evaluation in the need for uniformity of precedent in the state.
This rationale was advanced in Stiles v. Brown4 where the district court
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Walker v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 102 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1958).
186 So. 2d 820 (lst D.C.A. 1966), rev'd, 195 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1967).
Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939).
State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 1967).
177 So. 2d 672 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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was confronted with a challenge to the validity of a nonagricultural land
assessment. Overtones of great public interest were found to exist because
suit had been brought before exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the
court thought that the decision might therefore affect the revenues of the
entire state. For this reason the case was certified to the supreme court so
that a rule with a state-wide application could be established. Even when no
decision on point is to be found in Florida's case law, uniformity is still used
as the basis for certification. The court in McCullough v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 4 for instance, was called upon to decide a case of first impression
in the state, but the court decided to certify the question to the supreme
'4 2
court in order to "insure uniformity in the decisional law of our state."
Although uniformity of doctrine is undoubtedly of importance, there are
other considerations that might also be taken into account. As Chief Judge
Sturgis suggested in his dissent to the Walker decision,4 3 the district courts
could refuse to follow supreme court precedent if they chose to do so. The
chief judge's contention finds substantiation in the constitutional language
creating conflict jurisdiction in the supreme court. As he viewed the language,
it implies that the rule of stare decisis applies without distinction between
decisions of the district courts and the supreme court. The constitution does
recognize the potential existence of conflict between the courts, and more
significantly, since the supreme court has only discretionary reviewing powers
in the case of conflict, the constitution envisions a situation where a district
court might depart from supreme court pronouncements with no further
review of the decision.
It should also be recalled that the district courts were meant to assume
in large measure the functions of the supreme court. Both commentators 4 and
the supreme court45 have recognized this by their pronouncements that the
district courts are final courts in the judicial process of Florida. Consequently,
they do have the freedom to escape from an intermediate court philosophy,
which so often prevents them from molding law to meet the changing needs
of the state. As Chief Judge Sturgis pointed out, there are times when the

41. 176 So. 2d 345 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
42. McCullough v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 176 So. 2d 345, 350 (1st D.C-.A Fla. 1965).
43. Walker v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 101 So. 2d 437, 439 (1st D.C.A. Fla.
1958).
44. See supra note 7.
45. "To the point that it has appeared on occasion to be needless repetition we have
time and time against [sic] announced the view that in the great bulk of cases decided by
the Courts of Appeal, their decisions are final. It is appropriate to remind that certiorari
is not to be employed indiscriminately as an added escape route to reach the objective of
a second appeal. Once this court undertakes to relax the well-defined barriers which circumscribe and define its jurisdiction then the Courts of Appeal will become mere stepping
stones along the appellate way." Karlin v. Miami Beach, 113 So. 2d 551, 552, 553 (Fla.

1959).
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district courts will have occasion to decide cases contrary to prior decisions
of the supreme court: 46
[A]ny decision of a district court [of appeal] that is worthy of being
certified ... as ... of great public interest should always be a decision
that has been rendered on principles of law, ethics, and logic, attuned
to the ever-living present, and that such should be so even if it is found
necessary to depart, however reluctantly, from the rule of stare decisis.
Assuming that a district court would accept this challenge, the chief
judge noted that the initial result would be a modification of doctrine that
would become controlling under the rule of stare decisis. The supreme court
would then have the option to let the case stand, or if it thought the need
for conceptual consistency sufficiently great, it could review the case through
the exercise of its conflict jurisdiction. In either event, the district court's
ruling, substantiated by its written opinion, would be available for consideration. It is quite possible that the preexisting doctrine might find continued
application, but at least it would be the product of active evaluation rather
than from unyielding adherence to the rule of stare decisis.
THE SUPREME COURT

Soon after the district courts became operational the supreme court
enunciated its view of the respective spheres of jurisdiction that were to be
enjoyed by the appellate courts. As the court emphasized in Ansin v.
47
Thurston:
It was never intended that the district courts of appeal should be
intermediate courts. The revision and modernization of the Florida
judicial system at the appellate level was prompted by the great
volume of cases reaching the Supreme Court and the consequent delay
in the administration of justice. The new article embodies throughout
its terms the idea of a Supreme Court which functions as a supervisory
body in the judicial system for the State, exercising appellate power
in certain specified areas essential to the settlement of issues of public
importance and the preservation of . . . principle and practice, with
review by the district courts in most instances being final and absolute.
The question to consider is whether the supreme court has remained
true to the pronouncements of Ansin v. Thurston. Any encroachment upon
district court finality would have to originate in the conflict certiorari provisions of amended article V because, unless the supreme court is able to find

46. Walker v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 101 So. 2d 437, 439-40 (Ist D.C.A.
Fla. 1958).
47. 101 So. 2d 808, 810 (Fla. 1958). The court also expressed the view that failure
"to recognize that these are courts primarily of final appellate jurisdiction and to allow
such courts to become intermediate courts of appeal would result in a condition far more
detrimental to the general welfare and the speedy and efficient administration of justice
than that which the system was designed to remedy." Id.
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jurisdiction within the ambit of this section it has no authority to initiate
certiorari review. 4 8 As the following discussion will show, the conservative
philosophy expressed in Ansin has not been followed. By definitional expansion of decisions in direct conflict on the same point of law,49 the court has
been able to carry its jurisdiction far beyond the limited scope envisioned
by the courts and the constitution.
CertiorariReview of District Court Decisions Without Opinion
The expansion of the supreme court's jurisdiction and concomitant restriction of the finality of district court decisions has been especially pervasive in
those cases where district courts have rendered decisions without opinions.
Lake v. Lake,50 the first case to raise this problem, established the procedure
the supreme court initially was to follow. In Lake the court was requested
by petition for certiorari to review a judgment in which a district court
affirmed a circuit court decision without opinion .5 The petition was denied,
the court holding that it would not examine the record to determine whether
the district court's affirmance would create jurisdictional conflict with an
earlier decision of the supreme court.
The decision reflected the underlying history and purpose for the amendment to article V. As the court noted, the district courts were established to be
final appellate courts rather than "way stations on the road to the Supreme
Court. ''52 Referring to the responsibility of the supreme court, Justice Thomas
53
stated:
Sustaining the dignity of decisions of the district courts of appeal must
depend largely on the determination of the Supreme Court not to venture beyond the limitations of its own powers by arrogating to itself
the right to delve into a decision of a district court of appeal primarily
to decide whether the Supreme Court agrees with the district court of
appeal about the disposition of a given case.
However, by suggesting that there might be exceptional cases where an
examination of the record would be undertaken, the court did leave the door
open to the subsequent enlargement of its reviewing powers.
The supreme court's dissatisfaction with self-imposed jurisdictional limitations led to the gradual erosion of Lake v. Lake. In Scott v. Rosenthal,54 for
instance, a majority of the district court had reversed a circuit court in a per
48. Assuming that no grounds exist for an appeal, and that a district court has not

certified the case as one of great interest, conflict is the only remaining basis for jurisdiction.
The supreme court would have to establish the existence of a conflict on the same point
of law between the decisions of two district courts or between the decisions of a district
court and the supreme court. FLA. CoNsr. art. V, §4 (2), as amended (1956).
49. Id.

50. 98 So. 2d 761 (2d D.C.A.), cert. denied, 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
51. Id.

52. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
53.

Id.

54. 119 So. 2d 555 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), cert. granted, 131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961).
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curiam decision without opinion. However, a concurring opinion was found
to contain adequate factual background for the supreme court to entertain
the petition for certiorari55 In an attempt to resolve the jurisdictional issue,
the court returned the case to the district court so that it could adopt an
opinion setting forth the theory and reasoning in support of its reversal. The
dissent by Justice O'Connell5 6 forewarned of the emerging controversy. Although he agreed that an opinion would facilitate disposition of the jurisdictional problem, the justice thought it beyond the power of the court "to
direct a court of final appellate jurisdiction to write an opinion in any case.- 57
The factionalism that had developed among the judges came to the
surface in Donoghue v. Beeler,58 where a majority of the court denied a petition to review a district court decision without an opinion. Justice Hobson,
speaking for the three dissenting judges, 59 argued that Lake v. Lake was
distinguishable because in Donoghue a dissenting opinion had been filed by
a district court judge. Consequently, he would adopt the Rosenthal
rationale to consider whether the factual background set out in the dissent
indicated the presence of jurisdictional conflict. This procedure, according
to Hobson, would be consistent with the court's duty to maintain uniformity
because of the precedental value of the case.
The turning point was reached in the landmark decision of Foley v.
Weaver Drugs, Inc.,60 which reached the supreme court 61 on petition for
certiorari to review a district court decision without opinion.62 After examining the record proper for probable jurisdiction, the court postponed its
final determination and returned the case to the district court for an opinion.
Justice Thomas considered this procedure as a flagrant distortion of the
constitution designed to support the court's arrogation of power. He argued
that the court's action was not necessary to harmonize the law, but was instead
an attempt to see if the district court would write something inconsistent
with the views of the supreme court or another district court so that the
supreme court could determine whether it thought the case was decided
63
properly.
The district court, 64 refusing to comply with the supreme court's request,
would not outline reasons in support of its decision and the case was returned
to the supreme court. In a 4-3 decision, the court receded from Lake v. Lake
to hold that per curiam decisions without opinion by the district courts
would be subjected to an examination of the record proper on the question of

55. Id.

56. Id. at 482.
57. Id. at 483.
58. 149 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1963).
59. Id. at 535 (Roberts, C.J. & Terrell, J., dissenting).
60. 146 So. 2d 631 (3d D.C.A. 1962), cert. granted, 168 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1964), on rehearing, 172 So. 2d 907 (3d D.C.A.), writ discharged, 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
61. 168 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1964).
62. 146 So. 2d 631 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
63. 168 So. 2d 749, 751 (Fla. 1964).
64. 172 So. 2d 907 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
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conflict jurisdiction.6 5 The opinion of the court failed to consider the question of district court finality. The primary consideration instead was the
supreme court's obligation to maintain uniformity and harmony in the laws
of Florida. This function, according to the court, could only be performed
by examining the record proper when district court decisions are not sup66
ported by opinions.
Chief Justice Drew reached the constitutional issues, which the opinion
of the court had avoided.67 Since constitutional jurisdiction extends only to
decisions of district courts, Drew argued that an affirmance without opinion
of a trial court's decision is the equivalent of the adoption of that decision
by the district court. Drew also thought the decision of the court was justified
in light of the supreme court's duty to maintain harmony in the laws. He
expressed concern that the Florida court system might fail if the supreme
court should find it impossible to review decisions of the district courts.
Although this was conceded by the justice to be unlikely, he nevertheless
thought it the constitutional duty of the court to foreclose any possibility.
The chief justice was not unmindful of the need to insure the finality of
district court decisions. And his statistics do suggest that in large measure
finality of those courts has been preserved. 68 But as Justice Thornal noted,
the statistics reflect practices prior to the Foley decision. 69
Criticizing the expansion of the court's jurisdiction, Justice Thornal
argued it was contradictory to the sentiment that motivated the amendment
to article V. Moreover, the justice contended, the language of the constitution
will not support an examination of the trial record to create jurisdictional
conflict.7 0 Elaborating on the impact of the opinion by the court, Thornal
7
said: 1
All of this simply means that the District Court decisions are no longer
final under any circumstances. It appears to me that the majority view
is an open invitation to every litigant who loses in the District Court,
to come on up to the Supreme Court and be granted a second appeal.

65. 177 So. 2d 221, 225 (Fla. 1965).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 229.
68. According to Chief Justice Drew, less than 30% of the petitions for certiorari were
granted by the supreme court. Of this number two-thirds of the district court decisions
remained undisturbed after review by the supreme court. Id. at 230.
69. Justice Thornal suggested that the small percentage of district court decisions
disturbed by the supreme court was due to two factors: "(1) the judicial restraint which
this Court has heretofore exercised in refusing to extend its jurisdiction beyond constitutional limitations, and (2) the excellent judicial competence of the District Courts themselves." Id. at 234.
70. "It should be recalled that we are dealing with that provision of our Constitution
which authorizes this Court to review by certiorari 'any decision of a district court of
appeal that is in direct conflict with a decision' of the Supreme Court 'on the same point
of law . . . .' Let us not forget the proposition that we here deal with judicial power to
acL If the Supreme Court has the power to act in the instant case we must find it imbedded
in the language of the Constitution." Id. at 233.
71. Id. at 234.
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Beyond Foley. The expanded jurisdictional powers assumed by the majority in the Foley case have been exercised frequently since that decision. The
significance of these cases is perhaps assessed most effectively by the justification
that the court has advanced for its action. As a primary reason for bringing
the record proper within its jurisdictional prerogatives, the court has often
mentioned the necessity of maintaining uniformity in the law.72 Evaluation
of the Foley decision by this criterion suggests there is merit to the court's
position, because if the court should be unable to review a district court's
decisions where no opinion is written, then irreconcilable conflict might
'7 3
develop. To illustrate this point, Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Williams,
emphasizes the wisdom of retaining the power to review the record proper.
The jury in the Williams case had been instructed on the railroad
"comparative negligence" statute, 74 and while the trial court's decision was
pending appeal in the district court, the statute was held unconstitutional by
the supreme court.7 5 The district court, however, denied a motion that would
have reflected the supreme court's holding. Upon affirmance by the district
court without opinion, the supreme court accepted conflict jurisdiction and
remanded the case for a new trial.76 As justification for its jurisdiction, the
supreme court noted that it had remanded two other cases for new trials
because the comparative negligence statute had been applied. Consequently,
the inconsistency among the districts would have been apparent if the court
had failed to exercise jurisdiction.77
The Williams case does suggest that an absolute bar to the consideration
of district court decisions without opinions would prove unsatisfactory in
view of the supreme court's obligation to maintain harmony in the law. This
does not mean though that uniformity will support unlimited review of the
record proper behind a decision. As long as the scope of review remains
correlative to the requirements of uniformity, then some review of the record
proper may be justified. Unfortunately, the supreme court has not seen fit
always to evaluate the scope of its review in light of its constitutional
obligations.
Saf-T-Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp.7 8 is indicative of the extent
to which the supreme court has expanded the scope of its jurisdiction. After
the case was decided by the district court without opinion,79 The supreme
court accepted conflict jurisdiction, citing Foley as authorization for an
examination of the record proper. The basis of conflict, however, was
72. E.g., Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1966).
73. 189 So. 2d 417 (4th D.C.A. 1966), afl'd, 199 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1967).
74. FLA. STAT. §768.06 (1967).
75. Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965).
76. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Williams, 189 So. 2d 417 (4th D.C.A. 1966), aff'd, 199 So.
2d 469 (Fla. 1967).
77. Justice Drew, concurring, considered the Seaboard case as the fulfillment of his
prophecy in the Foley case that there would be chaos in the judicial system if it were impossible for the supreme court to review district court decisions without opinions, 199 So.
2d at 471, 472 (Fla. 1967).
78. 185 So. 2d 15 (4th D.C.A. 1966), cert. granted, 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
79. Id.
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language in a 1934 supreme court decision o that the court conceded was
arguably dictum. If justification for the court's review must be found in its
duty to maintain uniformity, then Saf-T-Clean suggests that the definition
of conflict jurisdiction has overreached its foundation. In a case of this nature
it would appear that the court is exercising its jurisdiction in order to
determine the correctness of a district court holding, a function not provided
for by amended article V.81
Examination of the Record Proper Behind District Court Opinions
The jurisdictional concepts established by the supreme court in Foley
have been extended to district court decisions, which are accompanied by
opinion. This step was taken in SinclairRefining Co. v. Butler, 2 a case based
upon Florida's survival statute. The trial court's instructions on the question
of damages were alleged as error, the pertinent provisions of the district court's
opinion stating: "Sinclair urged error in the following particulars: (1) The
trial court's instructions to the jury on issues of damages .... "8 3 Disposing
of this question the district court stated it had reviewed the instructions
and had found no harmful error committed by the trial court. Petition for
certiorari based on alleged conflict was denied by the supreme court after
oral arguments. But upon a rehearing, the court went behind the district
court's opinion in an examination of the record proper. Reviewing the jury
instructions, the court noted that the trial judge had instructed that funeral
expenses could be considered in awarding damages. Since another district
court 4 had disallowed funeral expenses under "somewhat similar" circumstances, the supreme court held that it had jurisdiction of the case. According
to a majority of the court, the conflict was "no less real" because the district
court had not discussed the point in question. It was sufficient that the point
of law "was, in effect, affirmed without discussion by the district court."
As Chief Justice Thornal noted in dissent,8 5 the Sinclair decision carries
the jurisdictional concepts of Foley one step further. Not only has the
supreme court arrogated to itself the power to "excavate" trial records in an
attempt to find a conflict when a district court fails to write an opinion,
86
but as Thornal said:
80.

Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934).

81. "When our jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to this provision of the [Florida] Constitution, we are not permitted the judicial luxury of upsetting a decision of a Court of
Appeal merely because we might personally disagree with the so-called 'justice of the case'
as announced by the Court below. In order to assert our power to set aside the decision
of a Court of Appeal on the conflict theory we must find in that decision a real, live and
vital conflict within the limits above announced." Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d
731, 734-35 (Fla. 1960).
82. 172 So. 2d 499 (3d D.C.A. 1965), cert. granted on rehearing, 190 So. 2d 313 (Fla.
1965).
83. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler, 172 So. 2d 499, 501 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
84. Doby v. Griffin, 171 So. 2d 404 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
85. 190 So. 2d 313, 320 (Fla. 1965).
86.

Id.
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Now they tell us that even when a District Court files a complete and
detailed opinion, the Supreme Court may sua sponte dig back through
the trial record in an effort to pick up something which, in its opinion
the District Court has allegedly overlooked.
The decision in Sinclair has in effect overruled the earlier case of South
Florida Hospital Corp. v. McCrea.8 7 The court in that case justified its
refusal to examine a record behind an opinion on the grounds that legal
principles are to be found in the language of opinions rather than in the
record. In Sinclair the jurisdictional "point of law" was found not in the
opinion, but in the jury instructions. With the inconsistency obscured to
that extent, it becomes difficult to rationalize an examination of the record
in terms of any duty to maintain harmony in the law. As Justice Thomal
suggested, it appears instead that the court has utilized Foley as a vehicle that
will enable the court to choose which rule it thinks should be applied.
Although a district court decision without an opinion may warrant an
examination of the record, the same considerations fail to support the
supreme court when it undertakes an examination of a record behind an
opinion. As Friedrich Kessler has pointed out, there has been a trend away
from stare decisis in the direction of stare dictus. But even though dictum
has gained significance as precedent, there is as yet little precedential value
to be found in the underlying record. Consequently, it is difficult to justify
the court's action in Sinclair as necessary to maintain uniformity in the law.
Most trial records are replete with language that to some extent may
be inconsistent with language in another record or opinion. When the
supreme court begins to sift through this material in search of something a
district court has overlooked, one gains the distinct impression that the court
is concerned not so much with the precedential value of a case, but rather
with whether the supreme court thinks the district court decided the case
correctly. While this may be a natural predilection of an appellate judge, it
should be recalled that the constitutional amendment in 1956 removed this
function from the court's consideration. Instead, the court was to act in a
supervisory capacity, maintaining uniformity in the decisions of the appellate
courts of Florida.
CONCLUSION

This note has attempted to expose some of the major factors that have
contributed to the erosion of the district courts' stature. No attempt has
been made to catalog all possible underlying causes, nor will this writer try
to run the gauntlet of potential consequences. Yet there are some problems
that should definitely be considered. Among the more practical is the question
of whether the United States Supreme Court is empowered to entertain
review of a decision of a Florida district court. The Court's appellate
jurisdiction is limited to a review of judgments of the highest court of a state
in which a decision could be had.88 Florida's district court decisions have
87. 118 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1960).
88. 28 U.S.C. §1257 (1964).
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been accorded this finality89 and have been subject to review by the High
Court. Fort v. City of Miami9° is an example. In that case the state argued
to the United States Supreme Court that the petitioner should have invoked
conflict jurisdiction to obtain review by the Florida supreme court. However,
neither the state nor the petitioners referred the court to any conflicting
decisions in Florida's appellate courts. Consequently, the Court decided that
Fort had sufficient finality to support federal review.
A consideration of the trial record in the Fort case might have produced
some degree of inconsistency with language in another decision in one of
Florida's appellate courts. The United States Supreme Court would then
have been presented with the question whether the inconsistency was sufficient
to activate the conflict jurisdiction of the Florida supreme court. Since the
concept of conflict on the same point of law as yet apparently has no outer
bounds, it would be difficult for the United States Supreme Court to assess
the finality of a district court decision without a determination of that question by the Florida court. And unless the Court is able to determine the
issue of finality it would have no jurisdiction to entertain the case. Thus, the
present scope of conflict jurisdiction exercised by the Florida supreme court
would support the argument that there should never be a review of a district
court decision by the United States Supreme Court.
Another problem relates to the primary reason behind the establishment
of the district courts. It will be recalled that they were largely a response
to the overwhelming caseload of the supreme court, and for a time they did
reduce this load to manageable proportions. 1 Each year, however, the number of cases on the supreme court's docket has increased until today its
dimensions exceed those that existed before the addition of four more
appellate courts to the judicial system. 92 It is true there have been procedural
revisions that have been able to alleviate some of the increasing burdens, but
as a compensating factor, procedure has its limitations. If experience is any
indication of the future, we can expect to witness the continual expansion
of the supreme court docket as the district courts send more cases for
further review and as the supreme court itself increases its burdens by
encroaching further into the jurisdiction of the district courts.
WILLIAM D. RavEs, III

89. E.g., Nash v. Florida Indus. Commn, 389 U.S. 235 (1967); Callendar v. Florida, 380

U.S. 519 (1965).
90. 389 U.S. 918 (1967).
91. Although the supreme court's caseload never decreased to the recommended level
of 300 cases per year, the number did decrease substantially after the district courts became
operative. In 1957, for instance, the court's caseload was 470, F-It ANN. REP., JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF FLA. 13 (1958).
92. In 1956, immediately before the district courts were established, the supreme court
caseload was 1,903, see note 2 supra. By 1967 the total caseload had reached 1,469, of which
there were 526 petitions for certiorari from the district courts. THIRTEENT ANN. REP.,
JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLA. (1966).
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